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of	 any	 social	 development	 policy	 strategy.	 Energy	
services	 such	 as	 heating,	 cooling,	 cooking	 and	
lighting	meet	 basic	 needs	 to	 sustain	 life,	 and	 fulfil	
secondary	 socio-economic	 benefits	 such	 as	
recreation,	 educational	 attainment,	 economic	
productivity	and	poverty	alleviation.	Meeting	energy	
service	 needs	 for	 the	 world’s	 poorest	 people	
necessitates	 the	 use	 of	 different	 fuel	 sources	 and	
technologies	under	varying	geographic,	political	and	
socio-economic	 conditions.	 For	 many	 in	 the	
developing	 world,	 energy	 services	 are	 met	 by	 the	
burning	of	solid	carbon-based	fuels	such	as	charcoal,	
wood,	 peat	 or	 lignite	 (commonly	 referred	 to	 as	
brown	coal).	The	use	of	such	fuels	is	problematic	due	






(so	 called	 electricity	 ‘grids’)	 and	 the	 connection	 of	
commercial	and	residential	properties,	has	become	
an	 energy	 policy	 priority	 –	 driven	 by	
intergovernmental	 organisation	 and	 donor	




opportunities	 for	 improving	 the	 wellbeing	 and	
livelihoods	 of	 the	 world’s	 poorest	 people,	 this	
process	 is	 not	 automatic.	 Electricity	 access	 is	
commonly	measured	in	terms	of	the	total	number	of	
grid-connected	 communities	 and/or	 households;	
however,	the	focus	upon	the	technical	infrastructure	
and	 the	 expansion	 of	 grid	 connection	 often	 belies	
problems	experienced	by	households.	Issues	such	as	
electricity	pricing,	 supply	 intermittency,	 poor	 grid-
connection	reliability,	as	well	as	cultural	and	social	
practices	of	energy	service	use	(such	as	preferences	
for	 specific	 cooking	 fuels	 for	 example)	 create	 a	
complex	interwoven	picture	of	energy	use,	demand	
and	 supply.	 Moreover,	 expansion	 of	 grid	 and	
electricity	 access	 is	 embedded	 in	 institutional	 and	
policy	 contexts	 that	 favour	 certain	 outcomes,	
geographies	 and	 social	 groups.	 Such	 problems	 of	
unequal	 access	 are	 exacerbated	 by	 domestic	 and	
regional	 disruption	 –	 i.e.	 civil	 unrest,	 political	
contestation	 and	military	 conflict	 –	 and	 exogenous	
factors	 such	 as	 extreme	 weather	 events	
(exacerbated	 by	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change),	
global	 financial	 crises,	 changes	 in	 diplomatic	
relations,	 inward	 investment	 and	 potential	
‘enclaving’	 [1,	 2].	 Electricity	 access	 is	 therefore	
fundamentally	 an	 issue	 of	 energy	 justice	 [3]–	 one	
that	 is	 attendant	 to	 broader	 political,	 geographical	
and	socio-cultural	factors.	This	Energy	Insight	paper	
presents	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 electricity	 access	
challenge.	The	first	part	outlines	the	difficulties	and	
opportunities	 of	 expanding	 grid	 access	 to	 improve	
electricity	 service	 provision	 to	 the	 poorest	 people	
globally,	and	the	second	explores	the	complexity	of	
the	 political	 and	 justice	 implications	 of	 electricity	
access	provision,	with	reference	to	an	in-depth	case	
of	Mozambique.		
Part 1 – The electricity access challenge 
Poverty	alleviation	for	the	lowest	income	developing	
nations	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 multi-dimensional	
problem	that	involves	simultaneous	progress	across	
17	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs).	The	SDGs	
cover	health,	 gender	equality,	 jobs	and	 livelihoods,	
environmental	 protection,	 and	 institutional	
governance.	 They	 are	 a	 comprehensive	 policy	 and	
planning	 tool	 for	 setting	 a	 global	 agenda	 to	 end	
poverty	 [4].	 However,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 clear	
transnational	 political	 commitment	 to	 improving	
development	 outcomes	 through	 the	mechanism	 of	
the	 SDGs,	 despite	 significant	 progress	 in	 the	 last	
decade,	 nearly	 800	 million	 people	 still	 live	 in	
extreme	poverty	–	defined	as	those	earning	$1.90	per	
day	or	less	[5].	The	global	challenge	of	multi-scalar	
and	 multi-sectoral	 poverty	 alleviation	 involves	 a	
complex	array	of	policy	and	economic	development	
options.	At	the	core,	however,	is	a	need	to	improve	
opportunities	 for	 the	 poorest	 people,	 primarily	 by	
widening	access	to	public	services	(including	health	
and	 education)	 and	 basic	 infrastructure	 such	 as	






to	 directly	 improve	 electricity	 and	 fuel	 access.	
Energy	 access	 is	 commonly	 posited	 as	 the	 mirror	
opposite	of	energy	poverty	–	a	condition	of	unstable	
and/or	unaffordable	access	 to	electricity	and	clean	
fuels.	 SDG#7	 presents	 a	 challenge	 to	 policy	
institutions,	 non-governmental,	 industry	 and	 third	
sector	organisations.	Achieving	this	goal	requires	the	
simultaneous	 development	 of	 both	 physical	
resources	 (including	 technological	 infrastructures,	
minerals	and	other	extractive	commodities,	research	
and	innovation,	and	ecosystem	services)	and	social	
infrastructures	 (including	 political	 institutions,	
public	services,	cultural	assets,	capacity	building	and	
nurturing	 local	 capabilities,	 and	 transparent	
governance	 systems)	 [10,	 11],	 such	 that	 social	
welfare	 is	 maximised	 through	 access	 to	 energy	
services,	 and	 not	 just	 the	 private	 profit	 of	 energy	
organisations.	 Social	 scientists	 commonly	 refer	 to	
these	 inter-related	 sets	 of	 social	 and	 physical	
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components	 as	 ‘socio-technical’	 systems	 [12,	 13]	
that	bring	together	a	web	of	inter-connected	human,	
physical,	 material	 and	 technological	 elements.	
Electricity	provision	and	access	are	key	examples	of	
this	socio-technical	framing	[14-16]	–	the	provision	
of	 the	 service	 is	 not	 solely	 explained	 by	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 technical	 infrastructure,	 but	
rather	 in-relation	 to	 the	 broader	 patterning	 of	
energy	 services,	 contexts	 and	 cultures	 in	 which	
energy	 connects	 with	 the	 social	 life	 of	 users.	
Electricity	 access	 also	 underpins	 related	
commitments	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 anthropogenic	
climate	disruption	 from	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	
and	so	the	socio-technical	system	of	energy	services	
connects	 deeply	 with	 the	 broader	 ecological	 and	
geophysical	 systems	 that	 support	 human	 and	non-
human	life	and	wellbeing	on	a	global	scale.		
Energy	 access	 as	 a	 policy	 priority	 involves	
increasingly	 complex	 and	 interconnected	
international	 agreements	 on	 sustainable	 energy	
access	 and	 climate	 change.	 The	 global	 spotlight	 on	
rural	 electrification	 and	 sustainable	 energy	
transitions	is	mobilising	billions	of	dollars	in	finance	
for	technology	transfer	to	the	Global	South,	either	to	
increase	 generation	 capacity	 or	 to	 extend	 grid	
infrastructures	 and	 domestic,	 or	 household	
connections	[17,	18].	For	instance,	in	2013	investors	
mobilised	US$13.1	billion	globally	in	energy	access,	
with	 97%	 of	 that	 funding	 targeting	 electricity	
networks	 [17].	 However,	 the	 deployment	 of	
significant	 financial	 resources	 to	 advance	
sustainable	energy	goals	has	often	reproduced	what	
could	 be	 termed	 neoliberal	 policy	 prescriptions.	
Public	sector	roles	in	energy	services	provision	are,	
in	many	cases,	 limited	to	regulatory	functions	such	
as	 creating	 an	 ‘enabling	 environment’	 for	 clean	
energy	technologies	to	grow	[19].	This	represents	a	
shift	 towards	 the	 development	 of	 the	 ‘regulatory	
state’	 [20],	 characterised	 by	 processes	 of	
privatisation	 and	 deregulation	 which	 replaced	 the	
‘dirigiste	state’	of	the	past	(whereby	the	state	exerts	
a	 strong	directive	 influence	 over	 investment)	 [21].	
Thus	 regulation,	 rather	 than	 public	 ownership,	
planning	or	centralised	administration,	have	become	
the	 key	 contextual	 factors	 influencing	 how	 low	
carbon	energy	transitions	have	come	to	be	governed	
[22].	
Despite	 the	 socio-technical	 nature	 of	 electricity	




centralised	 grid	 infrastructures.	 With	 a	 strong	
international	 focus	 on	 electricity	 grid	 extension,	
much	 existing	 development	 research	 has	 focused	
upon	 binary	 metrics,	 such	 as	 whether	 or	 not	 a	
household	has	an	electricity	connection	[23].	Yet	the	
energy	access	challenge	is	more	complex.	Clearly,	the	
expansion	 of	 domestic	 connections	 does	 not	
automatically	 guarantee	 access	 to	 reliable	 and	
sustainable	 electricity.	 Moreover,	 even	 where	 the	
headline	metric	of	grid	access	is	increasing,	this	does	
not	 necessarily	 help	 policymakers	 to	 understand	
how	 expanding	 energy	 access	 relates	 with	 overall	
socio-economic	development.		
Electricity	access	 can	be	problematised	 in	multiple	
ways.	 First,	 is	 that	 where	 electricity	 grid	 access	
exists,	it	is	often	unreliable	(especially	in	remote	and	
rural	 locations).	 In	 many	 developing	 states,	
electricity	 access	 is	 commonly	 through	 irregular,	
patchy	and	informal	(often	illegal)	connections	[24].	
On	 a	 technical	 level,	 there	 are	 further	 factors	 to	
consider,	such	as	–	 is	 the	connection	to	 the	central	
grid	 or	 an	 independent	 ‘islanded’	 micro-grid?	 Are	
connections	 safe	 and	 well	 maintained?	 Are	 grid	
connections	 and	 electricity	 supply	 affordable?	 Is	
access	dependent	on	one	or	more	energy	generation	
technologies?	 Is	 there	 sufficient	 skills	 capacity	 for	
repair	and	maintenance	of	electricity	services?	[25].	
Second,	 for	electrification	programmes	 intended	 to	
connect	 new	 users	 nationally,	 these	 often	 do	 not	
significantly	contribute	either	 to	 the	 intensification	
of	 electricity	 consumption	 nor	 to	 the	 reduction	 of	
biomass	 (such	 as	 charcoal	 and	 fuelwood)	 use	 in	
households.	This	 is	because	 the	domestic	 choice	of	
energy	 source	 is	 dependent	 on	 factors	 such	 as	
fluctuating	 and	 uncertain	 prices	 and	 on	 household	
capability	 to	 invest	 in	 new	 energy-consuming	




it	 should	 (normatively)	 remain	 a	 key	 poverty	
alleviation	strategy	[26].	
By	relegating	electricity	access	to	a	solely	technical	
issue,	 the	 solution	 is	 often	 viewed	 at	 least	 by	
mainstream	 observers	 and	 decision-makers,	 as	 a	
process	reliant	on	achieving	economies	of	scale,	and	
one	 that	 can	 be	 delivered	 and	 managed	 in	 a	
depoliticised	 and	 socially-neutral	 manner	 [27].	
Critical	 geographers	 and	 social	 scientists	 studying	
energy,	however,	have	increasingly	come	to	question	
this	view,	pointing	to	the	complexities	of	access	and	
the	 socio-political	 dimensions	 of	 energy	 provision	
and	 energy	 infrastructures	 as	 key	 sites	 of	
contestation	 [28,	 29].	 On	 a	 simple	 level,	 electricity	
access	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 three	
“Rs”—	rural	electrification	(the	process),	reform	of	
the	 electricity	 sector	 (the	 catalyst),	 and	 renewable	
and	 other	 low	 carbon	 energy	 technologies	 (the	
means)	[30].	Yet,	in	trying	to	improve	access,	across	
the	world	 there	has	been	 significant	 growth	 in	 the	
development	 of	 centrally	 planned	 electricity	
transmission	 and	 distribution	 networks,	with	 little	
attention	 paid	 by	 policy-makers,	 infrastructure	
development	 bodies,	 and	 planners	 to	 the	 broader	
social	impacts,	institutional	configurations	and	local-
regional	 development	 goals	 that	 drive	 particular	
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socio-technical	 system	 changes.	 It	 is	 necessary	
therefore,	to	structure	energy	transitions	and	socio-
technical	system	changes	in	context-specific	ways	–	
to	 incorporate	 ‘bottom-up’	 assessment	 of	 the	
political,	 economic	 and	 social	 circumstances	 of	
regional,	 national	 or	 sub-national	 energy	 systems	
in	which	new	technologies	are	to	be	applied	[31].	
Moreover,	quantifying	the	impacts	of	energy	access	
gains	 (or	 conversely	 the	 lost	 opportunities)	 to	
vulnerable	populations	 remains	highly	 challenging,	
so	that	calculating	the	costs	and	benefits	of	different	
electrification	 strategies	 remains	 difficult.	
Furthermore,	many	of	 the	centralised	grid	systems	
emerging	globally	rely	on	fossil	fuel-based	sources	of	
electricity,	 such	 as	 thermal	 coal,	 oil	 or	 gas.	 Energy	
networks	 are	 commonly	 subject	 to	 technological	
‘obduracy’	 and	 ‘carbon	 lock-in’	 –	 or,	 how	 a	
combination	of	political,	economic	and	technological	
path	dependencies	resulting	from	colonial	histories,	
poverty,	 resource	 availability	 and	 technological	
capacity,	steer	energy	system	development	down	a	
carbon	 intensive	 pathway,	 which	 becomes	
increasingly	difficult	to	reverse	[32-34].		
National	 governments	 are	 frequently	motivated	 to	
expand	 centralised	 grid	 networks	 (either	 low-
carbon	or	 carbon-intensive)	 because	domestic	 and	
commercial	 energy	 consumption	 is	 a	 key	 tool	 for	
economic	 growth	 of	 local	 and	 national	 economies.	
Some	states	are	further	motivated	to	invest	in	large	
energy-related	 infrastructures	 as	 a	 means	 forge	
visible	 connections	 with	 citizens	 (and	 voters)	 in	
their	 daily	 lives,	 at	 least	 at	 the	 level	 of	 political	
rhetoric	[35,	36].	This	issue	of	the	political	framing	of	






forward	 with	 controversial	 policy	 measures	
unimpeded	 by	 democratic	 scrutiny.	 The	 energy	
security	dilemma	 is	 one	 form	of	 this	 securitisation	
frame	 –	 the	 perceived	 need	 to	 build	 new	
infrastructure	 to	 meet	 development	 needs	 means	
that	 land-use	 changes	 for	 grid	 infrastructure,	
renewable	 energy	 generation	 technologies	 and	
others	(such	as	biomass,	or	new	fossil	fuel-powered	
systems)	 are	 implemented	 without	 access	 to	
information,	 opportunities	 for	 public	 scrutiny,	
access	to	public	participation	in	decision-making	or	
legal	 redress	 in	 the	 event	 of	 environmental	 justice	
disputes.	 Securitisation	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	
infrastructure	 expansion	 is	 a	 growing	 problem	
across	both	high	and	 low-income	economies	under	
conditions	 of	 rapid	 low-carbon	 transition	 [22,	 37,	
38].		
From	a	development	perspective,	we	are	faced	with	
multiple,	 seemingly	 incommensurable	 problems.	
The	 first,	 is	 the	 mass	 expansion	 of	 universal	
electrification	 (and	 supporting,	 yet	 often	 largely	
invisible	infrastructures,	including	power	grid	lines	
and	substations,	pipelines,	 converters	and	outlets).	
The	 second,	 is	 the	 assurance	 of	 rights,	 justice,	
environmental	 protections	 and	 democratic	
accountability	 within	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 its	
interaction	 with	 the	 wider	 political	 economy.	 The	
third,	 is	avoidance	of	dangerous	climate	change	by	
reducing	 the	 carbon	 footprint	 of	 multiple	 (and	
overlapping)	 socio-technical	 energy	 systems.	
Balancing	 these	 three	 policy	 priorities	 is	 an	
enormous	 challenge	 for	 international	 governance	
institutions,	 national	 and	 regional	 governments,	
local	development	agencies	and	civil	society	groups.	
This	Energy	Insight	aims	to	contribute	to	debates	on	
sustainable	 energy	 access	 across	 this	 ‘trilemma’	 of	
the	 political	 economy	of	 energy	 [39-41].	We	do	 so	
through	 suggesting	 that	historical-institutional	 and	
political-economic	perspectives	offer	a	set	of	tools	to	
examine	 energy	 access	 and	 energy	 usage	 in	
particular	places	and	contexts.	These	tools	foster	an	
analysis	 of	 structural	 conditions	 [42]	while	 posing	
questions	about	who	wins,	who	loses	and	why,	as	a	
result	 of	 particular	 policy	 frameworks	 and	 socio-
technical	 systems	 [43].	 As	 Castán	 Broto	 et	 al.	 [44]	
observed,	 “Not	 all	 transitions	 are	 just,	 and	
transitions	 themselves	 may	 generate	 further	
inequalities.”	
The benefits of electrification 
Mass	 electrification	 and	 access	 to	 reliable	 energy	
services	is	an	important	goal	for	social	and	economic	
development	 and	 human	 wellbeing.	 As	 previously	
mentioned,	 electricity	 provision	 has	 tremendous	
social	 value,	 as	 well	 as	 offering	 secondary	
improvements	 to	 health	 and	 local	 environmental	
conditions	[11,	45,	46].	For	many	people	across	the	
world,	 heating	 and	 lighting	 is	 provided	 by	 open	
flames	–	such	as	wick	lamps	or	oil	lamps,	open	fires	
and	 candles	 [47].	 These	 are	 very	 low-efficiency	
heating	 and	 lighting	 sources.	 The	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions	associated	with	wood	fuel	and	kerosene-
based	 systems	 is	 significant.	 There	 are	 also	
considerable	health	 impacts	 from	 the	 inhalation	of	
black	 carbon	 and	 particulates	 produced	 by	 open	
flames.	 Providing	 electricity-based	 solutions	 to	
heating,	 cooking	 and	 lighting	 therefore	 has	
immediate	 health	 benefits	 from	 improved	 air	
quality,	 reduced	 risk	 of	 uncontrolled	 fires	 and	
associated	 injury	 and	 death,	 as	 well	 as	 potential	
domestic	 cost	 savings,	 thus	 improving	 household	
incomes.		
Policies	 and	 industry	 strategies	 to	 improve	 energy	
security	through	mass	electrification	in	urban,	peri-
urban	and	rural	 locations	can	provide	a	number	of	
substantive	 advantages.	 First,	 improvement	 of	
electricity-based	 energy	 provision	 can	 raise	 living	
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standards	 for	 the	 poorest	 people,	 in	 terms	 of	
amenities	and	services.	For	example,	in	many	cases,	
increasing	 access	 to	 electricity	 reduces	 household	
expenditures	for	energy	services	(such	as	kerosene)	
by	replacing	them	with	direct	access	[48,	49].	Other	
energy	 services	 are	 of	 growing	 social	 significance.	
Mobile	 phones	 are	 becoming	 an	 important	 part	 of	
many	 local	 and	 regional	 development	 strategies.	
Phones	are	often	presented	in	the	popular	media	as	
non-essential	luxury	items,	however,	we	argue	that	
they	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 basic	 needs	
technologies	 across	 all	 levels	 of	 society.	 Access	 to	
mobile	 phones	 improves	 educational	 outcomes,	
mental	 health,	 political	 engagement	 and	 social	
capital	 available	 to	 the	 poorest	 people	 [50-54].	
Additionally,	 phone	 access	 provides	 better	
integration	 of	 family	 networks	 and	 social	 support	
(particularly	under	conditions	of	forced	or	seasonal	
migration	 due	 to	 environmental	 stressors,	 civil	
unrest	 or	 market	 changes),	 improved	
communication	 with	 business	 services,	 supply	
chains	 and	 financial	 organisations	 (including	




educational	 materials,	 practical	 information	 to	
improve	 community	 adaptive	 capacity	 and	 the	
strength	 of	 social	 networks.	 Mobile	 phones	 and	
underlying	 electrical	 and	 terrestrial	
telecommunications	 infrastructure	 reduce	
communication	 costs	 and	 therefore	 allows	
individuals	 and	 firms	 to	 send	 and	 to	 obtain	
information	 quickly	 and	 cheaply	 on	 a	 variety	 of	
economic,	social,	and	political	topics.	Reduced	cost	of	
mediated	communication,	 in	turn,	 leads	to	tangible	
economic	 benefits,	 improving	 agricultural	 and	
labour	 market	 efficiency,	 producer	 and	 consumer	
welfare,	alongside	with	wider	rural	connectivity	[55,	
56].	However,	the	poorest	people,	particularly	those	




constraints.	 Given	 the	 (variable	 but	 generally	
increasing)	 rate	 of	 uptake	 of	 mobile	 phone	
technologies	 across	 the	 developing	world	 [57,	 58],	
providing	 reliable	 electricity	 sources	 for	 this	
purpose	 alone	would	 have	 beneficial	 development	
outcomes.		
Second,	 improvements	 in	 the	 availability	 of	
electricity	services	increases	the	direct	and	indirect	
employment	 opportunities	 for	 supply-side	 energy	
services.	 These	 include	 electricity	 generation,	
technology	installation,	distribution	and	sale	across	
the	 energy	 delivery	 chain,	 and	 the	 economic	
development	 effects	on	 the	demand	 side	 –	 such	as	
improving	productivity	of	rural	 industries	(such	as	
food	processing)	[30,	49].	As	mentioned	in	relation	
to	 the	 twin	 commitments	 of	 improving	 electricity	
access	 and	 reducing	 global	 climate	 change	 risk,	
numerous	 innovations	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 low-
carbon	 energy	 innovation	 ‘space’.	 These	 include	
micro-renewables,	 such	as	 stand-alone	 solar	water	
heaters	 and	 solar	 photovoltaics	 (PV),	 wind	 power	
and	 geothermal	 technologies,	 micro/mini-grids,	
alongside	 innovations	 such	 as	 agrivoltaics,	 which	
combine	solar	PV	suspended	above	growing	areas	to	
provide	shade	 for	high-value	crops	 [59].	There	are	
also	 innovations	 with	 aquavoltaic	 systems,	 or	 so-
called	 “floatovoltaic”	 technology	 –	 water-deployed	
solar	 photovoltaic	 systems	 combined	with	 farming	
of	 aquatic	 organisms	 [60].	 Accordingly,	 there	 is	 a	
rapid	 expansion	 of	 local	 markets	 for	 renewable	
electricity	 generation,	 technology	 installation,	
maintenance	and	consulting	[61,	62].		
Given	these	dynamics,	enhancing	electricity	access	is	
not	 solely	 a	 challenge	 for	 development	
organisations,	 it	 also	 represents	 opportunities	 for	
human-centred	 and	 bottom-up	 community	 energy	
provision	 [63],	 entrepreneurial	activity,	new	 forms	
of	 public-private	 partnerships,	 and	 models	 of	
community	 ownership	 for	 energy	 generation	 [64,	
65].	As	Alstone	et	al.	[66]	argue,	the	contemporary	
electricity	technology	landscape	is	permeated	with	
rapidly	 developing	 (and	 rapidly	 spreading)	
decentralised	 network	 models	 and	 systems.	
Community	 energy	 provision	 is	 primarily	 brought	
about	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 decentralised	
energy	 networks,	 which	 combine	 high-efficiency	
consumer	 and	 end-use	 appliances	 and	 low-cost	
renewable	 energy	 generation	 technologies	
including	 (but	 not	 limited	 to)	 low-cost	
photovoltaic	cells	[64,	65,	67].	As	Alston	et	al.	[66]	
continue,	 the	 growth	 in	 decentralised	 systems	 to	
improve	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	 electrification	 is	 a	
type	 of	 technological	 evolution,	 facilitated	 by	 the	
growth	 in	 information	 technology	 access,	
specifically	 through	 mobile	 phone	 network	
infrastructure	and	virtual	 financial	 services.	They	
argue	 that	 decentralised	 electricity	 systems	 are	
disruptive	 in	 that	 they	 rapidly	 increase	 access	 to	
basic	electricity	services	to	improve	quality	of	life,	
whilst	simultaneously	driving	action	towards	low-
carbon	 development	 –	 effectively	 bypassing	 the	
need	for	centralised	and	grid-connected	fossil	fuel-
based	systems.	
Third,	 a	 shift	 from	black-carbon	 based	 energy	 and	
fuel	sources	(e.g.,	lignite	[brown	coal],	peat,	dung	or	
domestic	 charcoal)	 towards	 domestic	 electricity-
powered	lighting	and	gas	or	geothermal	heating	will	
greatly	 reduce	 the	 health	 risks	 [68],	 such	 as	
respiratory	 disorders,	 cancer	 and	 heart	 disease	
associated	with	prolonged	exposure	to	black-carbon	
fuels	[24,	68-71].	Moreover,	a	shift	from	centralised	
fossil	 fuel-based	 electricity	 production	 from	 coal	
(particularly	 lignite)	 will	 reduce	 the	 carbon	
emissions	 per	 unit	 of	 energy	 and	 thus	 mitigate	






world’s	 most	 populous	 cities.	 There	 is	 a	 need	
therefore	 for	 the	 simultaneous	mass	 electrification	




heating	and	 lighting	 is	 associated	with	widespread	
local	 environmental	 degradation	 and	 poor	
environmental	health,	primarily	from	deforestation	
for	fuelwood	and	charcoal.	An	estimated	2.7	billion	




which	 charcoal	 is	 causing	 forest	 damage	 is	
preventing	 an	 effective	 policy	 response	 [75].	
However,	 case	 studies	 in	 different	 developing	
country	contexts	using	different	methods	(including	
satellite	 image	 observational	 studies	 and	
ethnographic	 studies)	 do	 show	 deforestation	
occurring	 [76-78].	 Mass	 charcoal	 production	
provides	opportunities	 for	 income-generation	 [79],	
though	 it	 commonly	 damages	 biodiversity	 and	
ecosystem	service	provision,	with	resultant	negative	
impacts	 upon	 agricultural	 capacity	 and	 human	
health	 and	wellbeing	 [80,	 81].	 Over	 80%	 of	 urban	







participate	 in	 the	 production	 and	 sale	 of	 charcoal,	
primarily	 to	 provide	 an	 economic	 safety	 net	 by	
supplementing	 other	 sources	 of	 income.	 Policy	
responses	 to	 reduce	 household	 dependence	 on	
charcoal	must	therefore	not	only	replace	wood	fuels	
in	 domestic	 settings	 but	 must	 also	 provide	 an	
alternative	 income	 stream	 for	 farmers	 and	
labourers.		
Fifth,	 electrification	 has	 secondary	 social	 benefit	
outcomes	 beyond	 the	 direct	 economic	 benefits	 to	
households	 from	reduced	heating,	 lighting	and	fuel	
costs,	 or	 the	 alterative	 income	generation	 streams.	
For	example,	improved	heating	and	lighting,	reduced	
time	gathering	wood	fuels,	and	reduced	time	spent	










opportunities	 for	 women.	 Domestic	 electricity	
access	 helps	 to	 move	 women	 and	 girls	 into	 more	
economically	 productive	 activities,	 and	 Samad	 and	
Zhang	 [90]	 find	 that	 electrification	 measurably	
improves	 women's	 decision-making	 ability,	
mobility,	financial	autonomy,	reproductive	freedom,	
and	social	participation.	
Overall,	 the	 analyses	 discussed	 here	 have	
implications	 for	 the	 ability	 of	 lower-income	
developing	 economies	 to	 promote	 and	 sustain	





publicly-funded	 interventions,	 alongside	 nurturing	








focused	 heavily	 upon	 energy	 poverty,	 justice	 and	
people’s	everyday	lived	experiences	[44],	low	carbon	
energy	 transitions,	 along	 with	 social	 and	 cultural	
aspects	 of	 new	 lighting	 and	 cooking	 technologies	
[91].		
Related	 to	 the	 emerging	 debates	 in	 which	 the	
concept	 of	 ‘energy	 justice’	 figures	 prominently,	
Castán	 Broto	 [63]	 and	 Castán	 Broto	 et	 al.	 [44,	 92]	
have	 recently	 explored	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘energy	
sovereignty’	 over	 energy	 generation,	 transmission	
and	 distribution	 systems.	 In	 a	 developing	 and	
postcolonial	 context,	 this	 means	 learning	 to	
recognise	 how	 people	 themselves	 engage	with	 the	
making	 of	 technologies	 of	 everyday	 life	 through	
hybrid	 forms	of	 contextually	generated	 innovation.	
Another	stream	of	literature	highlights	the	local	and	
global	 infrastructures	 of	 production,	 transport	 and	
distribution	 of	 energy,	 along	 with	 practices	 of	
securing	 such	 activities	 and	 their	 spatial	
manifestations	 [93].	 Such	 spatial	 justice	 issues	
concern	 problems	 of	 land-grabbing,	 displacement	
and	 social	 oppression	 linked	 to	 large-scale	 energy	
investments	[2,	94].	This	analysis	seeks	to	uncover	
emerging	spatial	dimensions	of	power	and	politics,	
adding	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 state-building	 and	
geopolitical	 relations,	 particularly	 in	 postcolonial	
contexts.		
In	the	second	part	of	this	paper,	we	narrow	the	focus	
of	 electricity	 access	 within	 a	 geographically-
bounded	 case	 study.	 Specifically,	we	 explore	 these	
issues	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Sub-Saharan	 electricity	
access	 and	 development.	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	
discussion	 of	 a	 critical	 case	 of	 electricity	 access	 in	
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Part 2 – The political economy of electricity 
access: the case of Mozambique 
Electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa 
Although	 the	 benefits	 of	 electrification	 for	 global	
social	and	economic	development	are	clear	[95-97]	
in	many	states,	notably	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	most	
investments	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 fail	 to	 meet	 the	
energy	 needs	 of	 the	 poorest	 people,	 even	 in	
countries	 where	 access	 to	 grid-connected	 energy	
services,	unplanned	service	disruptions	and	power	
outages	 are	 commonly	 experienced.	 Moreover,	
supply	 of	 electricity	 is	 not	 always	 affordable,	 and	
many	 rural,	 off-grid	 and	 micro-grid	 systems	 only	
have	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	 provide	 a	 few	 hours	 of	
electricity	services	per	day.	Consequently,	even	 for	
many	 of	 those	 who	 have	 gained	 access	 through	 a	
permanent	 grid	 connection,	 the	 absolute	 level	 of	
electricity	 consumption,	 and	 access	 to	 electricity	
services	 is	 low,	 and	 as	 the	 International	 Energy	





is	 dedicated	 to	 producing	 energy	 for	 export	 while	
roughly	 half	 of	 current	 electricity	 consumption	 is	
used	 for	 industry	 –	 primarily	mining	 and	 refining,	
according	 the	 most	 recent	 Africa	 Energy	 Outlook	
[98].	 Moreover,	 the	 needs	 and	 priorities	 of	 users,	
particularly	 those	 of	 the	 poor,	 have	 been	 widely	
overlooked	in	national	energy	planning,	as	the	focus	
has	largely	been	on	locating	strategic	resources	for	
global	 markets	 rather	 than	 providing	 energy	
services	 tailored	 to	 local	 needs	 and	 conditions,	 or	
offering	a	meaningful	voice	 to	users	 [17,	100].	 It	 is	
necessary,	 therefore,	 to	 better	 understand	 and	
engage	with	the	interests,	power	relations	and	policy	
networks	 that	 shape	 the	 prospects	 of	 realising	
climate	and	energy	policy	goals;	acting	as	barriers	in	





concerns	 with	 energy	 security	 and	 sovereignty	
compete	with	 the	 demands	 of	 export	markets	 and	
the	need	to	facilitate	global	trade	and	resource	flows.	
Such	 national-economy	 scale	 concerns	 often	 take	
precedence	 over	 household	 and	 community	
perspectives	on	energy	access	and	use.	This	presents	
a	 serious	 challenge	 if	 ambitious	 targets	 to	 achieve	
50%	 -	 100%	 access	 to	modern	 energy	 services	 by	
2030	 in	 Africa	 are	 to	 be	 achieved.	 Electricity	
infrastructure	planning,	construction,	operation	and	
maintenance	 remain	 technically	 challenging	within	





internal	 sources	 (e.g.	 taxation-based	 public	
monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy,	 public-private	
partnerships)	 and	 external	 sources	 (donors,	 loans,	
inward	 investment	 and	 venture	 capital)	 funding	
[103].	 Furthermore,	 the	 management	 of	 complex	
financing	 programmes	 for	 energy	 system	
investment	requires	greater	emphasis	both	upon	the	
productive	 uses	 of	 energy,	 and	 upon	 effective	
processes	of	institutional	governance	to	ensure	that	
the	 vicious	 circle	 is	 broken	 between	 low	 incomes	
leading	 to	 poor	 access	 to	modern	 energy	 services,	
which	 in	 turn	 places	 limitations	 on	 the	 ability	 to	
generate	 higher	 incomes.	 Breaking	 this	 cycle	
requires	new	thinking	both	in	terms	of	the	types	of	
electricity	technologies	and	resources	deployed,	and	
in	 terms	 of	 the	 range	 of	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	
management	 of	 such	 complex	 socio-technical	
systems	[42,	96,	97].		
While	 the	 diversification	 of	 energy	 resources,	
policies,	 investment	 models	 and	 governance	
practices	 would	 be	 beneficial	 for	 rapid	 socially	
sustainable	energy	transitions,	the	current	dominant	
economic	model	across	much	of	sub-Saharan	Africa	
focuses	 on	 large-scale	 energy	 consumers	 whose	
activities	are	geared	towards	the	growth	of	top-level	
economic	indicators,	such	as	GDP,	in	continuity	with	




achieved	 through	 centralised	 power	 generation	
systems	 (usually	 situated	 in	 fossil	 fuel	 heartlands	
located	 close	 to	 industrial	 cities),	 and	 mass	
electricity	 transmission	 and	 distribution	 systems	
branching	outwards	from	industrial	centres	to	rural	
locations	 [105-107].	 The	 centralised	 electrification	
model	of	20th	Century	European	rural	development	
is	 increasingly	 challenged	 by	 decentralised	 and	




and	 community	 energy	 schemes	 [108-110].	 Thus,	
the	normative	ideal	of	centralised	power	generation	
in	Europe	is	now	shifting	towards	one	to	dispersed	
and	 decentralised	 socio-technical	 energy	 systems	
[66,	 111,	 112].	 However	 the	 rural	 electrification	
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model	 still	 remains	 influential	 across	 the	 African	
continent,	 where	 mega-projects	 and	 centralised	
power	systems	are	still	heavily	promoted	[35].	The	
development	of	specific	infrastructure	models	under	
certain	 governance	 arrangements	 is	 thus	mutually	
reinforcing	 –	 political	 governance	 models	 that	
involve	 state	 owned/controlled	 infrastructure	 and	
energy	resources	will	tend	towards	the	construction	
of	centralised	systems	of	energy	production,	which	
in	 turn	 creates	 a	 system	 of	 centralised	 political	
authority	 through	 the	 control	 of	 access	 to	 energy	
services	[102,	113].		
The case of Mozambique 
Mozambique’s	political	and	social	history	 is	deeply	
shaped	 by	 its	 colonial	 past.	 Mozambique	 lived	 for	
four	 centuries	 under	 Portuguese	 colonial	 rule,	 and	
the	 violent	 effects	 of	 colonial	 action	 remain	
significant	–	with	the	oppression	of	 the	slave	trade	
and	 brutal	 civil	 political	 repression	 by	 Portuguese	
authorities	 remaining	 salient	 in	 Mozambican	
memories	[114].	Mozambique’s	energy	system,	in	its	
current	 form,	 is	 also	 shaped	 by	 this	 political	 and	
economic	history.	During	 the	 colonial	 period,	 deep	
divisions	between	the	northern,	the	central	Zambesi	





valley,	 and	 the	 southern	 regions	 emerged.	 Under	
Portuguese	rule	in	the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries,	







development	 of	 infrastructure	 networks	 (e.g.	
railway	 corridors,	 roads	 and	 later	 power	
transmission	 lines),	 which	 linked	 regions	 of	 the	
country	 to	 their	 inland	 neighbours	 (South	 Africa,	




developed	 as	 three	 distinct	 systems:	 one	 in	 the	
south,	 around	 Lourenço	 Marques	 (the	 colonial	
designation	 of	 Maputo);	 another	 system	 in	 the	
centre,	associated	with	the	city	of	Beira;	and	a	third	
system	 consisting	 of	 dispersed	 urban	 centres,	 but	
largely	 disconnected	 from	 each	 other	 [117]	 (see	
Figure	1).	The	coastal	city	of	Beira	is	connected	to	the	





After	 Portugal’s	 Carnation	 Revolution	 of	 1974	 and	
the	decolonisation	 of	 its	African	overseas	 colonies,	
the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 Mozambique	 formed	 in	
1975,	 though	after	 two	years	of	 independence,	 the	
country	descended	into	a	protracted	civil	war	lasting	
from	 1977	 to	 1992.	 During	 the	 conflict,	 the	
FRELIMO-led	 (Frente	 de	 Libertação	 de	
Moçambique)	 government	 sought	 to	 use	 energy	
infrastructures	 as	 part	 of	 the	 larger	 project	 of	
national	unity	and	modernisation.	The	Cahora	Bassa	
hydroelectric	dam	was	to	play	a	key	role,	but	it	would	
also	 require	 the	 integration	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	
very	 limited	 colonial-era	 electric	 grid.	 To	 this	 end,	
the	 government	 created	 a	 state-owned	 electricity	
utility,	Electricidade	de	Moçambique,	E.P.	(EDM)	in	





1992.	 From	 1995,	 the	 post-war	 democratic	
restructuring	 of	 Mozambique	 saw	 the	
implementation	 of	 multi-party	 presidential	 and	
parliamentary	 elections	 –	 a	 process	 of	
democratisation	 that	 nonetheless	 has	 created	 a	
divide	in	civil	authority	between	the	ruling	FRELIMO	
party,	 and	 the	 opposition	 party	 RENAMO	 across	
multiple	 political	 scales	 –	 affecting	 both	 national	
policy	 and	 local	 frameworks	 of	 governance	 [118].	
The	post-war	period	also	saw	the	rebuilding	of	civil	
infrastructure.	 As	 such,	 EDM	 began	 to	 expand	 the	
domestic	 grid,	 with	 support	 from	 the	 donor	
community,	 regional	 partners	 and	 foreign	
investment	(ibid).	Since	then,	the	grid	has	expanded	
substantially,	 connecting	 all	 provincial	 centres	 and	
all	128	districts	(as	of	2014)	[119].	However,	several	
important	limitations	remain.	The	existing	network	





failure	 is	 enough	 to	 cut	 electricity	 to	 a	 vast	 area	
[120].	 The	 low	 rate	 of	 electricity	 access	 remains	 a	









but	 continues	 to	 face	 entrenched	 energy	 poverty.	
Furthermore,	the	country	has	experienced	a	regime	
change	from	socialism	to	capitalism,	followed	by	the	
privatisation	 of	 much	 of	 the	means	 of	 production,	
along	 with	 protracted	 job	 scarcity	 and	 new	 socio-
economic	dynamics	and	challenges	[115].	Concerns	
were	 raised	 in	 the	 post-war	 redevelopment	 and	
privatisation	 of	 state-owned	 firms	 and	 assets	 that	
such	 privatisation	 was	 tantamount	 to	 re-
colonisation	[122].	Energy	access	underpins	many	of	
these	 challenges,	 including	 rapid	 urban	 growth,	
gender	 and	 spatial	 inequality,	 and	 long-term	
environmental	 degradation.	 The	Mozambican	 state	
has	made	 electrification—both	urban	and	 rural—a	
major	 component	 of	 its	 development	 programs	
[123].	 Despite	 the	 Mozambican	 government’s	
modernising	 aspirations	 from	 the	 post-
independence	 period	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	
multiparty	 democracy	 in	 the	 1990s,	 through	 to	
recent	efforts	to	attract	global	investors	in	the	2000s,	
a	uniform	energy	provision	infrastructure	has	failed	
to	 emerge.	 Policymakers	 and	 agencies	 have	
struggled	 to	 coordinate	 interventions	 around	
domestic	cooking,	electrification	and	mechanisation	
needs	 in	 agriculture	 into	 long-term,	 integrated	
energy	planning	model.		
The	country’s	electricity	connection	metrics	include	
20.17%	 of	 the	 population	 being	 grid-connected,	




and	 city.	 For	 instance:	 95%	 of	 households	 have	
access	 to	 electricity	 in	 Maputo	 City,	 the	 capital	 of	





in	 access	 to	 electricity	 to	 the	 uneven	 distribution	
network,	 along	with	 the	 historical	 exclusion	 of	 the	
private	sector	from	investing	in	electricity	projects,	
and	 low	 tariffs	 that	 are	 insufficient	 to	 fund	 new	
expenditure	 without	 subsidies,	 while	 remaining	
beyond	 reach	 for	 many	 Mozambican	 households,	
particularly	 the	 poorest.	 Nonetheless,	 the	
electrification	 rate	 has	 significantly	 increased	 over	
the	past	two	decades,	growing	from	5%	in	2001	to	
27%	 in	 2017,	which	 has	 renewed	 optimism	 about	
the	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 50%	 by	 2023	 and	
delivering	 universal	 energy	 nationally	 by	 2030	
[121].		
The	 Mozambican	 government	 has	 endorsed	 the	
Sustainable	Energy	for	All	(SE4All)	targets	by	2030	
and	 the	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals	 (SDGs).	 It	
intends	to	achieve	the	SDG#7	through	two	strategies	
based	on	the	characterisation	of	areas	as	either	rural	





in	 cities	 and	 areas	 well-linked	 to	 commercial	
networks.	 Second	 is	 a	 strategy	 of	 decentralised	
generation,	operating	off	the	main	grid,	and	shaped	
by	a	recognition	of	the	limits	of	grid	extension	and	by	




low-cost,	 sustainable	 and	 alternative	 sources	 of	
electricity	in	areas	not	served	by	the	grid	[121].		
FUNAE	 promotes	 access	 to	 electricity	 through	
funding	 and	 implementing	 off-grid	 power	





administrative	 offices	 and	 pumping	 stations	 with	
solar	 panels	 [125].	 What	 is	 more,	 many	 of	 the	
household	connections	have	failed,	due	to	operation	
and	 management	 issues	 [126].	 Thus,	 there	 are	
difficulties	in	connecting	through	off-grid	systems	a	
considerable	 percentage	 of	 the	 5.9	 million	
households	 needed	 to	 achieve	 universal	 access	 to	
electricity	 networks	 [125].	 Compounding	 these	
challenges,	 urban	 population	 growth	 has	
outstripped	the	pace	at	which	households	have	been	
connected	 to	 the	grid	 [96,	127].	Moreover,	 in	early	
2019,	 two	 major	 cyclones	 –	 Idai	 and	 Kenneth	 –
caused	significant	damage	to	energy	and	other	basic	
infrastructure	 in	 Mozambique’s	 central	 and	
northern	 regions,	 the	 cost	 and	 governance	
challenges	 of	 rebuilding	 a	 resilient	 electricity	
network	 system	 in	 the	 affected	 areas	 require	
ongoing	financial	support	and	political	scrutiny.		
Some	 analysts	 emphasise	 the	 need	 to	 create	 the	
conditions	 for	private	sector	participation	 to	scale-
up	 and	 accelerate	 the	 pace	 of	 off-grid	 connections	
[123,	126]	in	order	to	achieve	electrification	targets	
whilst	 simultaneously	 reducing	 the	 burden	 of	
infrastructure	 provision	 on	 public	 finances	 [126].	
Fael	 [128]	 has	 suggested	 that	 private	 sector	
participation	will	require	the	creation	of	a	regulating	
entity	to	control	and	inspect	the	tariffs	applied	by	all	
operators	 to	 avoid	 oligopolistic/cartel	 practices.	




enter	 electricity	 supply	 markets	 without	 public	
finance	 assistance	 and	 governmental	 policy	 and	
planning	support	[129].	Strong	regulatory	practices		
are	 necessary	 to	 protect	 consumers’	 rights	 and	
interests	 regarding	 tariffs	 and	 network	 costs,	 the	
type	 and	 quality	 of	 service	 provided,	 including	
complains	 related	 to	 damage	 to	 their	 household	
electrical	appliances	due	to	power	overload	after	a	
blackout	or	brownout.		
Access	 to	 grid-connected	 electricity	 remains	
aspirational	to	many	households	in	Mozambique.	As	
such,	 promises	 of	 electricity	 provision	 are	 often	
mobilised	as	a	tool	for	political	campaigns	to	attract	
voters,	 including	 in	 the	 recent	 national,	 provincial	
and	local	elections	of	October	2019.	Yet,	the	majority	
of	 Mozambicans	 continue	 to	 rely	 on	 charcoal	 and	
biomass	 to	 meet	 their	 energy	 needs.	 In	 urban	
centres,	 charcoal	 is	 the	 major	 energy	 source	 for	
cooking,	whilst	fuelwood	remains	the	primary	fuel	in	
rural	areas	[117,	130].	Growing	demand	for	both	fuel	
types	 drives	 high	 wood	 extraction	 rates	 over	
increasing	areas	of	 forest	 [130].	CO2	 emissions	per	
capita	remain	comparatively	low	amongst	Southern	
African	 states,	 at	 an	 estimated	 0.2	metric	 tons	 per	
capita	(2016)	growing	at	an	average	annual	rate	of	
5.52	 %	 [131].	 However,	 	 the	 transition	 to	 a	 low	
carbon	 economy	 is	 gaining	 policy	 and	 public	
attention	 in	 Mozambique.	 By	 most	 accounts,	
Mozambique’s	 energy	 system	 is	 in	 transition:	
renewables	 are	 shifting	 the	 expectations	 of	 energy	
access,	particularly	in	rural	areas	[132].	As	growing	
deforestation	 pushes	 the	 supply	 of	 charcoal	 and	
fuelwood	further	from	major	cities,	raising	costs	and	
secondary	 environmental	 impacts,	 there	 are	
growing	 calls	 to	 use	 domestic	 fossil	 fuel	 resources	
(including	 the	 newly-discovered	 natural	 gas	
deposits	 in	 the	 northern	 Rovuma	 basin,	 on	 the	
border	with	Tanzania)	for	the	social	benefit	or	public	
good	 of	 citizens	 [133].	 The	 ambivalence	 and	
contradictory	 implications	 of	 an	 emerging	 energy	
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sits	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 national	 energy	 system,	
supplying	25%	of	electricity	 supplied	by	EDM.	The	
bulk	 of	 the	 electricity	 load	 (1500	 MW)	 is	 then	
exported	 to	 South	Africa	under	 a	 long-term	Power	
Purchase	Agreement	(PPA)	between	Hidroeléctrica	
de	Cahora	Bassa	(HCB)	and	South	Africa’s	electricity	
utility	 (Eskom),	 in	 force	 through	 2029	 [121].	
Mozambique	 has	 registered	 a	 deficit,	 however,	
between	demand	and	supply	as	the	PPA	restricts	its	
capacity	to	increase	the	supply	to	attend	the	growing	
national	 and	 regional	 demand	of	 electricity	 access.	
This	has	required	EDM	to	purchase	electricity	from	
other	 energy	 sources	 that	 have	 emerged	 since	 the	




exceed	 the	 amount	 that	 can	 be	 recovered	 from	
current	electricity	tariffs	[119].	This	use	of	IPPs	has	
exacerbated	 EDM’s	 finances	 and	 constrained	 its	
ability	 to	 raise	 funds	 for	 grid	 extension	 and	
maintenance.	
From	 a	 governance	 perspective,	 the	 Mozambican	
government	has	recently	approved	a	new	mandate	
for	 the	 energy	 regulatory	 authority,	 ARENE,	 to	
operate	from	2018,	with	enlarged	powers	over	tariff	
setting,	concession	granting	and	compliance	controls	
[125].	 The	 government’s	 announcement	notes	 that	
ARENE’s	 main	 activity	 is	 to	 regulate	 electricity	
subsectors,	 including	 those	 resulting	 from	 any	
source	 of	 RETs,	 liquid	 fuels,	 biofuels,	 and	 the	




electrification	 and	 fuel	 provision	 in	 multiple	
contexts.	 Shifts	 in	Mozambique’s	political	 economy	
of	energy	have	been	ongoing	since	the	early	2000s,	
when	the	government	opened	its	economy	to	large-
scale	 foreign	 investments,	 especially	 in	 extractive	
resources.	 In	 harnessing	 investment	 in	 these	
resources,	 including	 coal	 and	 offshore	 gas,	 the	
government	 aims	 to	 reduce	 long-term	 aid	




Notwithstanding	 these	 trends,	 two	 major	 policy	




Access	 Programme	 (ERAP).	 The	 second	 is	 the	
Roadmap	 for	 a	 Green	 Economy	 (GER)	 since	 2012,	
primarily	 aimed	 at	 rational	 natural	 resource	
utilisation	 (particularly	 energy)	 to	 preserve	
ecosystems	 for	 meeting	 The	 Sustainable	
Development	 Goals.	 The	 Mozambican	 state	
leveraged	 funding	 and	 support	 from	 the	 African	
Development	Bank	to	generate	what	it	describes	as	a	
“high-level”	 policy	 strategy.	 The	 roadmap	
establishes	 a	 series	 of	 ambitious	 development	
targets,	 namely,	 to	 become	 an	 inclusive	 middle-
income	 country	 by	 2030,	 whilst	 simultaneously	
increasing	 ecosystem	 service	 protections.	 The	GER	
policy	led	to	the	Green	Economy	Action	Plan	(GEAP),	
which	the	Council	of	Ministers	approved	in	October	
2013.	 GEAP	 was	 lauded	 as	 an	 inclusive	 and	
pluralistic	model	of	policy	development	–	including	
the	 participation	 of	 multiple	 governmental	
institutions,	alongside	regional	and	local	authorities,	
civil	 society	 and	 private	 sector	 stakeholders,	 and	
operating	in	concert	with	regional-to-national	scale	
public	 consultation.	 Thus	 there	 is	 considerable	
evidence	of	a	participatory-deliberative	 ‘turn’	[136,	
137]	 in	 energy	 policy	 –	whereby	 the	 legitimacy	 of	
policy	outcomes	is	derived	from	the	opportunity	of	
affected	 stakeholders,	 including	 so-called	 ‘lay	
publics’,	 to	 have	 direct	 input	 into	 the	 decision-
making	process.		
The	 GEAP	 intended	 to	 shape	 the	 government’s	 5-
year	plan	and	to	provide	the	basis	for	greening	the	
National	 Development	 Strategy	 currently	 under	
development.	 The	 plan	 is	 based	 on	 three	 pillars:	
sustainable	 infrastructure,	efficient	and	sustainable	









Although	 both	 policies	 focus	 on	 energy	 system	




by	 complicated	 governance	 factors.	 External	
evaluation	of	energy	governance	institutions	deems	
them		to	be	operationally	inefficient	and	plagued	by	
poor	 institutional	 reform	 [138-140].	 As	 such,	 The	







Broader governance challenges  
Aside	 from	 the	 electricity	 grid	 access,	 affordability	
and	reliability,	Mozambique	 faces	multiple	broader	
governance	 challenges.	 Additional	 factors	 concern	
the	country’s	political	economy	of	energy	and	wider	
networks	in	which	the	country’s	energy	production	
and	 consumption	 currently	 circulate.	 The	 policy	
focus	 upon	 grid	 expansion	 has	 prioritised	 energy-
generation	 ‘mega-projects’	 such	 as	 hydro-dams,	
which	 have	 stimulated	 rapid	 GDP	 ,growth,	 but	
created	 few	 jobs	 and	 few	 local	 linkages	 [141].	
Megaprojects	are	significant	because,	in	both	higher	
and	lower-income	economies,	they	provide	some	of	
the	most	 enduring	 technical	 achievements	 created	
within	society,	and	also	some	of	 the	most	costly	or	
damaging	 mistakes	 [142].	 Altshuler	 and	 Luberoff	
[143]	 argue	 that	 the	 neo-liberalisation	 of	
infrastructure	 management	 has	 encouraged	
governments	 to	 court	 major	 investors	 into	
infrastructure	 development	 through	 processes	 of	
privatisation	 of	 utilities,	 fiscal	 and	 regulatory	





to	 a	 turn	 towards	 ‘grand	 scale’	 or	 ‘mega-project’	
development.	Megaprojects	have	become	a	 form	of	
symbolic	 urban	 revitalisation	 through	 economic	
growth,	and	since	the	1990s	became	an	increasingly	
common	 feature	 of	 economic	 development	 across	
the	world.		
In	 Mozambique,	 in	 broad	 terms,	 the	 logic	 of	
neoliberal	 restructuring	 [122]	 has	 worked	 against	
distributive	intentions:	foreign	companies	are	lured	
to	large-scale,	export-oriented	projects,	rather	than	
connecting	 the	poor	 to	 the	 grid,	while	 the	ongoing	
financialisation	 of	 the	 energy	 sector	 makes	 it	
complicated	for	national	energy	companies,	such	as	
EDM,	 and	 local	 communities	 to	 exert	 influence.	
These	problems	of	governance	are	then	exacerbated	
by	the	high	levels	of	debt	accumulating	from	energy	
megaproject	 development	 [144].	 Energy	
megaprojects	 take	 decades	 to	 develop	 and	 build,	
involve	 agreement	 and	 cooperation	 from	 multiple	
public	 and	 private	 interests,	 and	 impact	 upon	
millions	of	people	either	directly	or	indirectly	[145].	
The	 broader	 social	 benefits	 from	 profit-sharing,	
infrastructure	 provision	 and	 regional	 development	
are	 commonly	 stressed	 by	 energy	 megaproject	
proponents	 to	 ‘sell’	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 disruptive	
megaproject	to	public	authorities.	It	is	the	potential	
mass	 profits	 and	 the	 supposed	 benefits	 that	 these	
bring	 in	 terms	 of	 employment	 and	 reducing	
‘economic	 friction’	 [145]	 that	 “justifies”	 the	
investment	 risk;	 megaprojects	 are	 therefore	
appealing	to	policy-makers	for	political	and	symbolic	
as	 well	 as	 practical	 reasons	 [146].	 However,	
megaprojects	 such	 as	 major	 hydro-schemes	
commonly	 fail	 to	 achieve	 their	 stated	 objectives,	
often	impose	heavy	cost	overruns,	project	delays	and	
unintended	 consequences,	 and	 these	 can	 only	 be	
absorbed	with	 great	pain	 and	difficulty,	 often	with	
little	public	support	[145-147].	
Moreover,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 lack	 of	 connection	
between	 EDM’s	 planning	 for	 grid	 expansion	 and	
municipal	planning	around	which	areas	are,	in	turn,	





services,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 security	 of	 energy	
supply,	and	specifically	the	supply	of	electricity	[35].	
Yet,	 the	 revelation	 in	 late	 2016	 of	 undisclosed	




resulted	 in	 armed	 clashes	 in	 2013	 through	 2017.	
This	political-economic	contestation	and	 insecurity	
has	 affected	 the	 central	 government’s	 push	 to	
expand	 energy	 provision	 and	 access	 to	 energy	 by	
local	populations	affected	by	the	conflict.		
Apart	 from	 these	 challenges,	 we	 still	 have	
insufficient	 knowledge	 concerning	 the	 practices	 of	
acquiring	and	using	energy	at	the	household	level	in	
Mozambique.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 shifts	 in	 the	 political	
economy	 of	 energy	 production	 have	 yet	 to	 fully	
transform	 energy	 provision	 and	 everyday	 energy	
practices	 in	 Mozambican	 households	 and	
businesses.	For	 instance,	 fuel	supply	chains	remain	




deforestation,	 particularly	within	 the	 hinterland	 of	
major	cities.	Though	there	is	a	paucity	of	qualitative	
and	 quantitative	 evidence,	 Castán	Broto’s	 research	
on	climate	compatible	planning	in	the	“Chamanculo	
C”	 neighbourhood	 of	 Maputo	 [152]	 found	 that	
residents	have	limited	expectations	of	municipal	or	
national	 intervention	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 urban	
infrastructure,	 including	 roads,	 sanitation,	 waste	
collection	 and	 electricity.	 Maputo	 has	 the	 highest	
electrification	rates	in	the	country,	but	many	of	the	





a	 measure	 of	 local	 control,	 or	 ‘sovereignty’	 over	
energy	resources.		
Baptista	 [29]	 offers	 an	 account	 of	 the	 shift	 to	 a	
prepaid	electricity	meters	 in	Maputo,	 implemented	
by	 EDM	 since	 2004	 to,	 among	 many	 reasons,	
facilitate	 access	 among	 consumers,	 reduce	
households’	 non-payment	 of	 electricity	 bills	 and	
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discourage	 illegal	 connections	 to	 the	 grid.	 Using	
ethnographic	 research	 to	 examining	 everyday	
practices	 in	 local	 communities,	Baptista	 found	 that	
the	 prepaid	 system	 has	 given	 households	 greater	
control	over	their	own	electricity	consumption	and	
allows	 urban	 dwellers	 to	 more	 easily	 gauge	 and	
understand	 what	 they	 consume,	 whilst	 reducing	
unexpected	high,	cumulative	or	incorrect	billings	by	
EDM,	 and	 thus	 avoid	 debt.	 Pre-payment	 has	
extended	 access	 to	 residents	 facing	 energy	
vulnerabilities,	despite	the	structural	inequalities	in	
Maputo’s	 provision	 of	 services	 [29].	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 the	 electricity	 tariffs	 that	 are	 above	 most	
household	 incomes	 have	 limited	 their	 continuous	
use	 of	 electricity	 services,	 and	 have	 forced	
households	to	adjust	their	electricity	consumption	to	
the	 financial	 resources	 available	 by	 combining	
charcoal	use	with	limited	use	of	electricity	[29,	63].	
These	 conditions	 resonate	 with	 the	 concepts	 of	
energy	 justice	 [153],	 scalar	 justice	 [154],	 and	 just	
transitions	 [43],	 which	 have	 argued	 that	 we	 must	
consider	the	multi-faceted	entanglements	of	electric	
power	 and	 political	 power	 when	 discussing	
generational	 and	 spatial	 justice	 within	 energy	
production	and	consumption.		
Conclusions 
Mozambique	 is	 a	 major	 centre	 of	 hydropower	
production	 and	 has	 extensive	 coal	 and	 natural	
reserves,	 making	 it	 a	 potentially	 energy-resource	
rich	 nation.	 Yet,	 while	 energy	 resources	 in	 the	
country	are	abundant,	Mozambican	citizens	has	thus	
far	 received	 little	direct	benefit,	especially	 those	of	
lower-income	 status	 or	 in	 rural	 and	 peri-urban	
areas.	 Demographic	 growth,	 new	 energy	
consumption	 patterns,	 growing	 risks	 of	 extreme	
weather	 and	 climate	 disruption	 events,	 and	








of	 extreme	 poverty	 by	 supporting	 citizens	 in	
securing	 sustainable,	 cleaner	 and	 safer	 energy	
sources	 to	 power	 multiple	 productive	 activities,	
mediated	communication,	education,	social	network	
growth	and	entertainment.	However,	this	movement	






and	 stagnation	 of	 electricity	 network	 development	
and	 its	 effects	 on	 everyday	 practices	 and	 uses	 of	
energy.		
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 explore	 scenarios	 of	 future	
development,	 and	how	 they	might	be	 achieved	 (or	
resisted),	in	order	to	enact	practical	and	sustainable	
grid	 access	 benefits	 to	 the	 poorest	 in	 the	 country.	
What	 is	needed	 is	 further	decision-support	 related	
research,	in	which	policy	responses	can	be	tailored	
to	 future	 access	 goals,	 which	 account	 for	 broader	
socioeconomic	 and	 governance	 challenges	 and	 the	
ways	 in	 which	 social	 and	 political	 dynamics	 may	
reshape	 new	 energy	 systems.	 Currently,	 there	 is	 a	
gap	 between	 seeking	 to	 fulfil	 national	 SDGs	
(including	 SDG#7	 on	 universal	 energy	 access	 by	
2030)	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 poor	 households	 [125].	
Fostering	 local	 ownership	 of	 community-based	
systems,	 capacity-building	 approaches	 and	
stakeholder	 empowerment	 are	 approaches	 with	
untapped	 potential.	 The	 case	 of	 Mozambique	 also	
points	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 examining	 social	 and	
material	practices	of	acquiring	and	using	energy,	in	
some	 cases	produced	by	new	 technologies	 such	 as	
solar	 PV	 and	 gas-fired	 cooking,	 and	 the	 ways	 in	
which	people	 interact	with	 them.	Furthermore,	we	
must	 better	 understand	 the	 historical	 and	
geographic	 scope	 of	 electricity	 sector	 reform	 in	
regions	 beyond	 the	 capital,	 Maputo,	 and	 move	
beyond	static	understandings	of	grid	extension.	
Acknowledgements 
This	 Energy	 Insight	 was	 produced	 as	 part	 of	 the	
project:	A	Political-Economic	Analysis	of	Electricity	




Policy	 Management.	 The	 programme	 is	 funded	 by	
the	UK	Government,	through	UK	Aid.	 
The	 Applied	 Research	 Programme	 on	 Energy	 and	
Economic	 Growth	 (EEG)	 produces	 cutting	 edge	
research	on	the	links	between	energy	and	economic	
growth,	working	closely	with	policy	makers	in	Sub-
Saharan	 Africa	 and	 South	 Asia	 to	 build	 more	
sustainable,	 efficient,	 reliable	 and	equitable	 energy	





The	 views	 expressed	 in	 this	 Energy	 Insight	 do	 not	









1.	 Sidaway,	 J.D.,	 Enclave	 space:	 a	 new	
metageography	of	development?	Area,	2007.	39(3):	
p.	331-339.	
2.	 Lesutis,	 G.,	 Spaces	 of	 extraction	 and	
suffering:	 Neoliberal	 enclave	 and	 dispossession	 in	
Tete,	Mozambique.	Geoforum,	2019.	102:	p.	116-125.	
3.	 Sovacool,	 B.K.	 and	 M.H.	 Dworkin,	 Global	
Energy	 Justice.	 2014,	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	
University	Press.	
4.	 UNDP,	Transforming	 our	world:	 The	 2030	
agenda	 for	 sustainable	 development.	 Division	 for	
Sustainable	Development	Goals:	New	York,	NY,	USA,	
2015.	










8.	 Sen,	 A.,	 Commodities	 and	 capabilities.	
Oxford	University	Press.	1999,	Oxford.	
9.	 Day,	 R.,	 G.	 Walker,	 and	 N.	 Simcock,	
Conceptualising	 energy	 use	 and	 energy	 poverty	
using	a	capabilities	framework.	Energy	Policy,	2016.	
93:	p.	255-264.	
10.	 Gylfason,	 T.,	 Natural	 resources,	 education,	
and	 economic	 development.	 European	 economic	
review,	2001.	45(4-6):	p.	847-859.	
11.	 Nilsson,	M.,	D.	Griggs,	and	M.	Visbeck,	Policy:	
map	 the	 interactions	 between	 Sustainable	
Development	Goals.	Nature	News,	2016.	534(7607):	
p.	320.	
12.	 Walker,	 G.	 and	 N.	 Cass,	 Carbon	 reduction,	
‘the	 public’	 and	 renewable	 energy:	 engaging	 with	
socio-technical	configurations.	Area,	2007.	39(4):	p.	
458–469.	
13.	 Geels,	 F.W.,	 Technological	 transitions	 and	
system	 innovations:	 a	 co-evolutionary	 and	 socio-
technical	analysis.	2005:	Edward	Elgar	Publishing.	
14.	 Verbong,	 G.P.	 and	 F.W.	 Geels,	 Exploring	
sustainability	 transitions	 in	 the	 electricity	 sector	




Africa:	 Accelerating	 access	 to	 electricity	 services	
through	 a	 socio-technical	 design	 in	 Kenya.	 Energy	
Research	&	Social	Science,	2015.	5:	p.	34-44.	
16.	 IEA,	Energy	Access	Outlook:	World	Energy	
Outlook	 Special	 Report.	 2017,	 Organisation	 for	
Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development	 and	 the	
International	Energy	Agency:	Paris.	
17.	 Practical	 Action,	 Poor	 People's	 Energy	
Outlook	2017.	2017,	Practical	Action:	Rugby.	
18.	 IEA,	Accelerating	SDG	7	Achievement.	Policy	
Brief	 autumn	 #01.	 Achieving	 Universal	 Access	 To	
Electricity.	2018,	International	Energy	Agency	(IEA),	
United	 Nations	 Development	 Programme	 (UNDP)	
and	 International	 Renewable	 Energy	 Agency	




19.	 Byrne,	 R.,	 K.	 Mbeva,	 and	 D.	 Ockwell,	 A	
political	 economy	 of	 niche-building:	 Neoliberal-
developmental	 encounters	 in	 photovoltaic	
electrification	 in	 Kenya.	 Energy	 research	 &	 Social	
Science,	2018.	44:	p.	6-16.	
20.	 Eberlein,	B.	 and	E.	Grande,	Regulation	 and	
infrastructure	 management:	 German	 regulatory	
regimes	 and	 the	 EU	 framework.	 German	 Policy	
Studies,	2000.	1(1):	p.	39.	
21.	 Levy,	 J.D.,	 ed.	The	 state	 after	 statism:	 new	
state	 activities	 in	 the	 age	 of	 liberalization.	 2006,	
Harvard	University	Press:	Boston,	MA.	
22.	 Cotton,	M.,	Planning,	infrastructure	and	low	
carbon	 energy,	 in	 Companion	 to	 Environmental	
Planning	 and	 Sustainability,	 S.	 Davoudi,	 et	 al.,	
Editors.	2019,	Routledge:	Abingdon.	p.	248-256.	
23.	 Bhatia,	 M.	 and	 N.	 Angelou,	 Beyond	
Connections	 :	 Energy	 Access	 Redefined.	 ESMAP	
Technical	 Report;	 008/15.	 2015,	 World	 Bank:	
Washington	DC.	
24.	 Smith,	 H.,	 M.	 Lorusso,	 and	 F.	 MacKillop,	
Powering	 the	 City	 in	 the	 Global	 South:	 Increasing	
Energy	Access	for	all	in	a	Context	of	Urbanisation	and	
Changing	 Governance.	 EEG	 State-of-Knowledge	
Paper	 Series.	 2017,	 Oxford	 Policy	 Management:	
Oxford.	
25.	 Avila,	 N.I.	 and	 D.M.	 Kammen,	 The	 Role	 of	
Renewable	Energy	in	Bridging	the	Electricity	Gap	in	
Africa.	 Current	 Sustainable/Renewable	 Energy	
Reports,	2018.	5(4):	p.	205-213.	
26.	 Arthur,	M.,	S.	Zahran,	and	G.	Bucini,	On	the	
adoption	 of	 electricity	 as	 a	 domestic	 source	 by	
Mozambican	 households.	 Energy	 Policy,	 2010.	
38(11):	p.	7235-7249.	
27.	 Hoika,	C.	and	J.	McArthur,	The	infrastructure	
of	 electricity:	 a	 technical	 overvie,	 in	 Oxford	
Handbook	 of	 Energy	 Politics,	 K.	 Hancock	 and	 J.	
EEG	Energy	Insight		 November	2019	
©	Applied	Research	Programme	on	Energy	and	Economic	Growth	 15	
Allison,	 Editors.	 2019,	 Oxford	 University	 Press:	
Oxford.	
28.	 Luque-Ayala,	A.	and	J.	Silver,	Introduction,	in	
Energy,	 Power	 and	 Protest	 on	 the	 Urban	 Grid:	
Geographies	of	the	Electric	City,	A.	Luque-Ayala	and	
J.	Silver,	Editors.	2016,	Routledge:	Abingdon.	
29.	 Baptista,	 I.,	 ‘We	 Live	 on	 Estimates':	
Everyday	 Practices	 of	 Prepaid	 Electricity	 and	 the	
Urban	 Condition	 in	 Maputo,	 Mozambique.	
International	 Journal	 of	 Urban	 and	 Regional	
Research,	2015.	39(5):	p.	1004-1019.	
30.	 Chaurey,	 A.,	 M.	 Ranganathan,	 and	 P.	
Mohanty,	 Electricity	 access	 for	 geographically	









33.	 Unruh,	 G.C.,	Understanding	 carbon	 lock-in.	
Energy	policy,	2000.	28(12):	p.	817-830.	
34.	 Hommels,	A.,	Studying	obduracy	in	the	city:	
Toward	 a	 productive	 fusion	 between	 technology	
studies	 and	 urban	 studies.	 Science,	 Technology,	 &	
Human	Values,	2005.	30(3):	p.	323-351.	




36.	 Kale,	 S.S.,	 Electrifying	 India:	 Regional	
political	economies	of	development.	2014,	Stanford:	
Stanford	University	Press.	
37.	 Bridge,	 G.,	 Energy	 (in)	 security:	 World-
making	 in	 an	 age	 of	 scarcity.	 The	 Geographical	
Journal,	2015.	181(4):	p.	328-339.	
38.	 Gebresenbet,	 F.,	 Securitisation	 of	
development	in	Ethiopia:	the	discourse	and	politics	
of	 developmentalism.	 Review	 of	 African	 Political	
Economy,	2014.	41(sup1):	p.	S64-S74.	
39.	 Gunningham,	 N.,	 Managing	 the	 energy	
trilemma:	 The	 case	 of	 Indonesia.	 Energy	 Policy,	
2013.	54:	p.	184-193.	
40.	 Tomei,	 J.	 and	 D.	 Gent,	 eds.	Equity	 and	 the	
energy	 trilemma:	 delivering	 sustainable	 energy	
access	 in	 low-income	 communities.	 2015,	
International	 Institute	 for	 Environment	 and	
Development:	London.	
41.	 Gent,	D.	and	J.	Tomei,	Electricity	 in	Central	
America:	 Paradigms,	 reforms	 and	 the	 energy	
trilemma.	 Progress	 in	 Development	 Studies,	 2017.	
17(2):	p.	116-130.	
42.	 Büscher,	B.,	Connecting	political	economies	
of	 energy	 in	 South	 Africa.	 Energy	 Policy,	 2009.	
37(10):	p.	3951-3958.	
43.	 Newell,	 P.	 and	 D.	 Mulvaney,	 The	 political	
economy	 of	 the	 ‘just	 transition’.	 The	 Geographical	
Journal,	2013.	179(2):	p.	132-140.	
44.	 Castán	Broto,	V.,	et	al.,	A	research	agenda	for	




electricity	 in	 developing	 countries.	 World	
Development,	2011.	39(6):	p.	1037-1050.	
46.	 Spalding-Fecher,	 R.,	 Health	 benefits	 of	
electrification	 in	 developing	 countries:	 a	
quantitative	assessment	in	South	Africa.	Energy	for	
Sustainable	Development,	2005.	9(1):	p.	53-62.	
47.	 Kaygusuz,	 K.,	 Energy	 services	 and	 energy	
poverty	 for	 sustainable	 rural	 development.	
Renewable	 and	 sustainable	 energy	 reviews,	 2011.	
15(2):	p.	936-947.	






rural	 electrification	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Fuel,	
2000.	1(1.2):	p.	1-4.	
50.	 Sife,	 A.S.,	 E.	 Kiondo,	 and	 J.G.	 Lyimo-Macha,	
Contribution	 of	mobile	 phones	 to	 rural	 livelihoods	
and	poverty	reduction	in	Morogoro	region,	Tanzania.	
The	 Electronic	 Journal	 of	 Information	 Systems	 in	
Developing	Countries,	2010.	42(1):	p.	1-15.	
51.	 Balasubramanian,	 K.,	 et	 al.,	 Using	 mobile	
phones	 to	 promote	 lifelong	 learning	 among	 rural	
women	in	Southern	India.	Distance	Education,	2010.	
31(2):	p.	193-209.	
52.	 Sinanan,	 J.	 Social	 tools	 and	 social	 capital:	
reading	 mobile	 phone	 usage	 in	 rural	 indigenous	
communities.	 in	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 20th	
Australasian	 conference	 on	 computer-human	
interaction:	designing	for	habitus	and	habitat.	2008.	
ACM.	
53.	 Aminuzzaman,	 S.,	 H.	 Baldersheim,	 and	 I.	
Jamil,	 Talking	 back!	 Empowerment	 and	 mobile	
phones	 in	 rural	 Bangladesh:	 a	 study	 of	 the	 village	
phone	 scheme	 of	 Grameen	 Bank.	 Contemporary	
South	Asia,	2003.	12(3):	p.	327-348.	
54.	 Furuholt,	 B.	 and	 E.	 Matotay,	 The	
developmental	 contribution	 from	 mobile	 phones	
across	 the	 agricultural	 value	 chain	 in	 rural	 Africa.	





economic	 development	 in	 Africa.	 Journal	 of	
Economic	Perspectives,	2010.	24(3):	p.	207-32.	
56.	 Parks,	 L.,	 Reinventing	 television	 in	 rural	




‘revolution’in	 Africa:	 rhetoric	 or	 reality?	 African	
Affairs,	2010.	109(437):	p.	659-668.	
58.	 Asongu,	 S.,	 The	 impact	 of	 mobile	 phone	
penetration	 on	 African	 inequality.	 International	
Journal	of	Social	Economics,	2015.	42(8):	p.	706-716.	
59.	 Dinesh,	H.	and	J.M.	Pearce,	The	potential	of	
agrivoltaic	 systems.	 Renewable	 and	 Sustainable	
Energy	Reviews,	2016.	54:	p.	299-308.	
60.	 Pringle,	 A.M.,	 R.	 Handler,	 and	 J.M.	 Pearce,	
Aquavoltaics:	Synergies	for	dual	use	of	water	area	for	
solar	 photovoltaic	 electricity	 generation	 and	
aquaculture.	 Renewable	 and	 Sustainable	 Energy	
Reviews,	2017.	80:	p.	572-584.	
61.	 Loiter,	 J.M.	 and	 V.	 Norberg-Bohm,	
Technology	 policy	 and	 renewable	 energy:	 public	
roles	 in	 the	 development	 of	 new	 energy	
technologies.	Energy	Policy,	1999.	27(2):	p.	85-97.	
62.	 Makridis,	C.,	Offshore	wind	power	resource	
availability	 and	 prospects:	 A	 global	 approach.	
Environmental	Science	&	Policy,	2013.	33(0):	p.	28-
40.	
63.	 Castán	 Broto,	 V.,	 Energy	 sovereignty	 and	
development	 planning:	 the	 case	 of	 Maputo,	
Mozambique.	 International	 Development	 Planning	
Review,	2017.	39(3):	p.	229-248.	
64.	 Berka,	A.L.	and	E.	Creamer,	Taking	stock	of	
the	 local	 impacts	 of	 community	 owned	 renewable	






in	 the	 Global	 South.	 Energy	 Research	 &	 Social	
Science,	2017.	31:	p.	263-272.	
66.	 Alstone,	 P.,	 D.	 Gershenson,	 and	 D.M.	
Kammen,	 Decentralized	 energy	 systems	 for	 clean	
electricity	 access.	 Nature	 Climate	 Change,	 2015.	
5(4):	p.	305.	
67.	 Koirala,	 B.P.,	 et	 al.,	Energetic	 communities	
for	 community	 energy:	A	 review	of	 key	 issues	 and	
trends	 shaping	 integrated	 community	 energy	
systems.	 Renewable	 and	 Sustainable	 Energy	
Reviews,	2016.	56:	p.	722-744.	
68.	 Smith,	 K.R.,	 Fuel	 combustion,	 air	 pollution	
exposure,	 and	 health:	 the	 situation	 in	 developing	
countries.	 Annual	 Review	 of	 Energy	 and	 the	
Environment,	1993.	18(1):	p.	529-566.	
69.	 Ezzati,	 M.	 and	 D.M.	 Kammen,	 The	 health	




70.	 Zhang,	 J.	 and	 K.R.	 Smith,	 Hydrocarbon	
emissions	 and	 health	 risks	 from	 cookstoves	 in	
developing	 countries.	 Journal	 of	Exposure	Analysis	
and	 Environmental	 Epidemiology,	 1996.	 6(2):	 p.	
147-161.	
71.	 Haines,	 A.,	 et	 al.,	 Policies	 for	 accelerating	
access	to	clean	energy,	improving	health,	advancing	





73.	 van	 Vliet,	 O.,	 et	 al.,	 Synergies	 in	 the	 Asian	
energy	 system:	 Climate	 change,	 energy	 security,	
energy	access	and	air	pollution.	Energy	Economics,	
2012.	34:	p.	S470-S480.	
74.	 Bensch,	 G.	 and	 J.	 Peters,	 Alleviating	
deforestation	pressures?	Impacts	of	improved	stove	
dissemination	 on	 charcoal	 consumption	 in	 urban	
Senegal.	Land	Economics,	2013.	89(4):	p.	676-698.	
75.	 Mwampamba,	 T.H.,	 et	 al.,	 Dispelling	




76.	 Oduori,	 S.,	 et	 al.,	 Assessment	 of	 charcoal	
driven	 deforestation	 rates	 in	 a	 fragile	 rangeland	
environment	 in	 North	 Eastern	 Somalia	 using	 very	
high	 resolution	 imagery.	 Journal	 of	 Arid	
Environments,	2011.	75(11):	p.	1173-1181.	
77.	 Sussman,	 R.W.,	 G.M.	 Green,	 and	 L.K.	
Sussman,	 Satellite	 imagery,	 human	 ecology,	
anthropology,	 and	 deforestation	 in	 Madagascar.	
Human	Ecology,	1994.	22(3):	p.	333-354.	
78.	 Labarta,	R.A.,	D.S.	White,	and	S.M.	Swinton,	
Does	 charcoal	 production	 slow	 agricultural	
expansion	 into	 the	 Peruvian	 Amazon	 rainforest?	
World	Development,	2008.	36(3):	p.	527-540.	
79.	 Jones,	D.,	C.M.	Ryan,	and	J.	Fisher,	Charcoal	
as	 a	 diversification	 strategy:	 The	 flexible	 role	 of	
charcoal	 production	 in	 the	 livelihoods	 of	
smallholders	 in	 central	 Mozambique.	 Energy	 for	
Sustainable	Development,	2016.	32:	p.	14-21.	
80.	 Chidumayo,	 E.N.	 and	 D.J.	 Gumbo,	 The	











and	 its	 implications	 to	 present	 and	 future	 forest	
availability.	 Energy	 Policy,	 2007.	 35(8):	 p.	 4221-
4234.	
83.	 Zulu,	 L.C.,	 The	 forbidden	 fuel:	 charcoal,	




Achieving	 sustainable	 charcoal	 supply	 from	
woodlands	to	urban	consumers	in	Kampala,	Uganda.	
International	 Forestry	 Review,	 2009.	11(1):	 p.	 64-
78.	
85.	 Mavhunga,	 C.C.,	 Cidades	 esfumaçadas:	
energy	 and	 the	 rural-urban	 connection	 in	
Mozambique.	Public	Culture,	2013.	25(2	70):	p.	261-
271.	
86.	 Zulu,	 L.C.	 and	 R.B.	 Richardson,	 Charcoal,	
livelihoods,	 and	 poverty	 reduction:	 Evidence	 from	
sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 Energy	 for	 Sustainable	
Development,	2013.	17(2):	p.	127-137.	
87.	 Wilhite,	 H.,	Gender	 Implications	 of	 Energy	
Use	 and	 Energy	 Access.	 2017,	 Oxford	 Policy	
Management:	Oxford.	




and	 home	 electrification:	 A	 case	 study	 in	





91.	 Kumar,	 A.,	 Justice	 and	 politics	 in	 energy	
access	 for	 education,	 livelihoods	 and	 health:	 how	
socio-cultural	 processes	 mediate	 the	 winners	 and	
losers.	Energy	Research	&	Social	Science,	2018.	40:	p.	
3-13.	
92.	 Broto,	 V.C.,	 et	 al.,	 Energy	 justice	 and	
sustainability	 transitions	 in	 Mozambique.	 Applied	
Energy,	2018.	228:	p.	645-655.	
93.	 Bridge,	 G.,	 B.	 Özkaynak,	 and	 E.	 Turhan,	
Energy	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 nation:	
Introduction	 to	 special	 issue.	 Energy	 Research	 &	
Social	Science,	2018.	41:	p.	1-11.	
94.	 Siamanta,	Z.C.	and	A.	Dunlap,	'Accumulation	





for	All:	 Innovation,	 technology	 and	pro-poor	 green	
transformations.	2016,	Abingdon:	Routledge.	
96.	 Brew-Hammond,	A.,	Energy	access	in	Africa:	
Challenges	 ahead.	 Energy	 policy,	 2010.	 38(5):	 p.	
2291-2301.	
97.	 Sokona,	 Y.,	 Y.	 Mulugetta,	 and	 H.	 Gujba,	
Widening	 energy	 access	 in	Africa:	Towards	 energy	
transition.	Energy	Policy,	2012.	47:	p.	3-10.	
98.	 IEA,	 Africa	 Energy	 Outlook.	 2014,	
International	Energy	Agency:	Paris.	
99.	 IEA,	Energy	Access	Outlook:	World	Energy	
Outlook	 Special	 Repor.	 2017,	 Organisation	 for	
Economic	 Co-operation	 and	 Development	 and	 the	
International	Energy	Agency:	Paris.	
100.	 Practical	 Action,	 Poor	 People's	 Energy	
Outlook	2018:	Achieving	Inclusive	Energy	Access	at	
Scale.	2018:	Practical	Action	Publishing	Limited.	
101.	 Naess,	 L.O.,	 et	 al.,	 Climate	 policy	 meets	
national	development	contexts:	Insights	from	Kenya	
and	 Mozambique.	 Global	 Environmental	 Change,	
2015.	35:	p.	534-544.	
102.	 Kennedy,	S.F.,	Indonesia’s	energy	transition	
and	 its	 contradictions:	 emerging	 geographies	 of	
energy	 and	 finance.	 Energy	 Research	 &	 Social	
Science,	2018.	41:	p.	230-237.	
103.	 Gregory,	 J.	and	B.K.	Sovacool,	The	 financial	
risks	 and	 barriers	 to	 electricity	 infrastructure	 in	
Kenya,	 Tanzania,	 and	 Mozambique:	 A	 critical	 and	
systematic	review	of	the	academic	literature.	Energy	
Policy,	2019.	125:	p.	145-153.	
104.	 Showers,	 K.B.,	 Electrifying	 Africa:	 An	
environmental	 history	 with	 policy	 implications.	
Geografiska	 Annaler:	 Series	 B,	 Human	 Geography,	
2011.	93(3):	p.	193-221.	
105.	 Cotton,	 M.	 and	 P.	 Devine-Wright,	 Putting	
pylons	 into	place:	a	UK	case	study	of	public	beliefs	
about	 the	 impacts	 of	 high	 voltage	 overhead	
transmission	 lines.	 Journal	 of	 Environmental	
Planning	 and	 Management,	 2013.	 56(8):	 p.	 1225-
1245.	
106.	 Morton	 Jr,	 D.L.,	 Reviewing	 the	 history	 of	
electric	power	and	electrification.	Endeavour,	2002.	
26(2):	p.	60-63.	
107.	 Lagendijk,	 V.,	 Electrifying	 Europe:	 the	
power	 of	 Europe	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 electricity	
networks.	 Vol.	 2.	 2008,	 Amsterdam:	 Amsterdam	
University	Press.	
108.	 Neves,	D.,	C.A.	Silva,	and	S.	Connors,	Design	
and	 implementation	 of	 hybrid	 renewable	 energy	





109.	 Hammons,	 T.J.,	 Integrating	 renewable	




Feed-in	 tariffs	 and	 the	 development	 of	 community	
wind	 energy	 schemes	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	
Germany.	Energy	Policy,	2013.	63:	p.	543-552.	
111.	 European	SmartGrids	Technology	Platform,	
Smart	 Grids:	 Vision	 and	 Strategy	 for	 Europe's	
Electricity	Networks	of	the	Future.	2006,	European	
Commission:	Luxemburg.	
112.	 Walker,	 G.	 and	 P.	 Devine-Wright,	





114.	 Cabecinhas,	 R.	 and	 J.	 Feijó,	 Collective	
memories	 of	 Portuguese	 colonial	 action	 in	 Africa:	






116.	 Igreja,	 V.,	 Politics	 of	 memory,	
decentralisation	 and	 recentralisation	 in	
Mozambique.	 Journal	 of	 Southern	 African	 Studies,	
2013.	39(2):	p.	313-335.	
117.	 Baptista,	 I.,	 Serviço	 Público	 de	 Energia	
Eléctrica	 de	 Moçambique:	 Perspectivas	 sobre	 o	




decentralization	 in	 post-war	 Mozambique.	 African	
Affairs,	1999.	98(393):	p.	455-484.	
119.	 World	 Bank,	 Republic	 of	 Mozambique:	
Mozambique	Energy	Sector	Policy	Note	(Report	No:	
ACS17091).	2015,	World	Bank:	Washington,	DC.	
120.	 EDM,	 Relatorio	 Anual	 de	 Estatıstica	
2015/Annual	 Statistical	 Report	 2015.	 2017,	
Electricidade	de	Moçambique,	E.P.:	Maputo.	
121.	 EDM,	 EDM	 Strategy	 2018	 -	 2028.	 2018,	
Electricidade	de	Moçambique,	E.P:	Maputo.	
122.	 Pitcher,	 M.A.,	 Recreating	 colonialism	 or	
reconstructing	the	state?	Privatisation	and	politics	in	
Mozambique.	 Journal	 of	 Southern	 African	 Studies,	
1996.	22(1):	p.	49-74.	
123.	 Uamusse,	 M.M.,	 et	 al.,	 Mini-Grid	
Hydropower	 for	 Rural	 Electrification	 in	
Mozambique:	Meeting	Local	Needs	with	Supply	in	a	
Nexus	Approach.	Water,	2019.	11(2):	p.	305.	
124.	 FUNAE.	 Nossas	 actividades.	 2019	 	 [cited	
2019	 07/10/2019];	 Available	 from:	
http://www.funae.co.mz/index.php/pt/quem-
somos/areas-actuacao,	.	
125.	 De	 Fatima,	 M.,	 S.	 Arthur,	 and	 A.	 Cockerill,	
The	 Roles	 of	 Government	 and	 the	 Public	 Utility	 in	
Achieving	Universal	Access	to	Electricity.	Economics	
of	Energy	&	Environmental	Policy,	2019.	8(1).	
126.	 Baruah,	 P.	 and	 B.	 Coleman,	 Off-grid	 solar	
power	 in	Mozambique:	 opportunities	 for	 universal	
energy	 access	 and	 barriers	 to	 private	 sector	
participation.	 2019,	Global	Green	Growth	 Institute:	
Seoul.	





Entidade	 Reguladora	 do	 Sector	 Eléctrico.	 2019,	
Servico	 de	 Partilha	 de	 Informacao,	 Centro	 de	
Integridade	Publica	–	CIP.	
129.	 Graham,	 S.	 and	 S.	 Marvin,	 Cherry	 Picking	
and	Social	Dumping:	Utilities	 in	the	1990s.	Utilities	
Policy,	1994.	4(2):	p.	113-119.	










133.	 Hanlon,	 J.	 and	 A.	 Nuvunga,	 Gas	 for	
development,	 or	 just	 for	 money?,	 in	 Servico	 de	
Parilha	 de	 Informação,	 No.	 8.	 2015,	 Centro	 de	
Integredade	Pública:	Maputo.	
134.	 Castel-Branco,	 C.N.,	 Growth,	 capital	




resource	 rents	 and	 institution-building	 in	
Mozambique	and	Angola.	WIDER	Working	Paper	No.	
102/2013.	 2013,	 UNU-WIDER,	 United	 Nations	






European	 Union.	 European	 Journal	 of	 Political	
Research,	2010.	49(4):	p.	471-495.	
137.	 Parkins,	 J.R.	 and	 R.E.	 Mitchell,	 Public	
Participation	as	Public	Debate:	A	Deliberative	Turn	
in	 Natural	 Resource	 Management.	 Society	 and	
Natural	Resources,	2005.	18(6):	p.	529-540.	
138.	 Nhete,	 T.D.,	 Electricity	 sector	 reform	 in	




in	 an	 imperfect	 world:	 A	 case	 study	 from	
Mozambique.	 Energy	 Policy,	 2008.	36(8):	 p.	 2785-
2794.	
140.	 OECD,	 OECD	 Investment	 Policy	 Reviews:	
Mozambique.	 2013,	Organisation	 for	Economic	Co-
operation	and	Development,:	Paris.	
141.	 Cunguara,	 B.	 and	 J.	 Hanlon,	Poverty	 is	 not	
being	reduced	in	Mozambique.	2010,	London	School	
of	Eoconmics:	London.	
142.	 Genus,	 A.,	 Decisions,	 Technology	 and	
Organizations.	2000,	Aldershot:	Gower.	
143.	 Altshuler,	 A.A.	 and	 D.E.	 Luberoff,	 Mega-
projects:	 The	 changing	 politics	 of	 urban	 public	
investment.	2004:	Brookings	Institution	Press.	
144.	 Baker,	 L.,	 The	 evolving	 role	 of	 finance	 in	
South	Africa's	 renewable	 energy	 sector.	 Geoforum,	
2015.	64:	p.	146-156.	
145.	 Flyvbjerg,	 B.,	 N.	 Bruzelius,	 and	 W.	
Rothengatter,	Megaprojects	and	Risk:	An	Anatomy	of	
Ambition.	 2003,	 Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	
Press.	
146.	 Szyliowicz,	 J.S.	 and	 A.R.	 Goetz,	 Getting	
realistic	about	megaproject	planning:	The	case	of	the	
new	 Denver	 International	 Airport.	 Policy	 Sciences,	
1995.	28(4):	p.	347-367.	
147.	 Flyvbjerg,	B.,	What	you	should	know	about	
megaprojects	 and	 why:	 an	 overview.	 Project	
Management	Journal,	2014.	45(2):	p.	6-19.	
148.	 Nhamire,	 B.	 and	 J.	Mosca,	Electricidade	 de	
Moçambique:	 mau	 serviço,	 não	 transparente	 e	
politizada.	2015,	ECIP,	Centro	de	Integridade	Pública	
Moçambique.:	Maputo.	
149.	 Roe,	 A.,	 Mozambique-bust	 before	 boom:	
Reflections	on	investment	surges	and	new	gas.	2018,	
WIDER	 Working	 Papers,	 World	 Institute	 for	
Development	 Economics	 Research	 (UNU-WIDER),	
United	Nations	University:	Tokyo.	
150.	 Navarra,	 C.	 and	 C.	 Udelsmann	 Rodrigues,	
Debt,	 aid	 and	 poverty	 in	 Mozambique:	 lessons	
learned	 from	 the	 Mozambican	 debt	 crisis.	 2018:	
Nordiska	Afrikainstitutet.	
151.	 Buur,	L.	and	P.	Salimo,	The	political	economy	
of	 social	 protection	 in	 Mozambique.	 2018,	 ESID	
Working	paper	No	103.	Manchester:	Effective	States	
and	 Inclusive	 Development	 Research	 Centre,	 The	
University	of	Manchester:	Manchester.	
152.	 Castán	 Broto,	 V.,	 D.	 Salazar,	 and	 K.	 Adams	




the	 Global	 Energy	 Challenge.	 2013:	 Palgrave	
Macmillan.	
154.	 Cotton,	M.,	Environmental	 Justice	as	Scalar	
Parity:	 Lessons	 From	 Nuclear	Waste	Management.	
Social	Justice	Research,	2018.	31(3):	p.	238-259.	
	
	
About	the	authors
Dr	Matthew	Cotton	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Human	Geography	at	the	University	of	York,	UK.	
matthew.cotton@york.ac.uk	
Dr	Joshua	Kirshner	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Human	Geography	at	the	University	of	York,	UK.	
Joshua.kirshner@york.ac.uk		
Dr	Daniela	Salite	is	a	Postdoctoral	Research	Associate	at	the	University	of	York,	UK,	and	visiting	researcher	at	the	
University	of	Eduardo	Mondlane,	Daniela.salite@york.ac.uk		
	
